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In this report,
Hanson and Brannon
examine the empirical
literature on the effect
of corporate income
taxes on labor, arguing that corporate tax
reform would boost employment.
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I. Executive Summary

With the highest top marginal corporate tax
rate among OECD nations and the third highest in
the world at 35 percent, it is not surprising that
policymakers have long evinced a desire to lower
the U.S. federal corporate income tax rate. Doing
so would have implications for a wide range of
outcomes — from federal revenue to foreign

direct investment — but the effects of such a
change on the labor market are less understood.
Despite high corporate income tax rates, the
United States collects relatively little revenue from
the corporate income tax — slightly more than
$300 billion in 2016, which amounts to about 10
percent of all federal receipts. High corporate
income tax rates are cause for concern, as they
deter multinationals from locating investment in
the United States and reduce the amount of capital
formation in the country, which affects
employment and wages.
Economists establish the effect of the
corporate income tax on employment and wages
by using a wide range of methods, including
international, national, and state-level
comparisons. The key to any empirical work is
attempting to disentangle the effects of the
corporate income tax from other factors that may
be correlated with both the corporate tax and
labor outcomes. We find estimates that use a
treatment and comparison set up within the
framework of the vast array of state-level
corporate tax changes to be the most effective way
to establish a clear link between corporate taxes
and labor outcomes. Other work that relies on
only federal changes is complicated by the many
national factors that also change with time.
In general, empirical work with the strongest
results, that controls for factors of influence
outside corporate income taxes, generally
suggests an elasticity of employment regarding
the corporate income tax rate of between -0.2 and
-0.4, with a wage-income elasticity near -0.5. In the
context of recent tax reform discussions that
propose a rate reduction of 10 to 20 percentage
points, that would imply long-run employment
gains between 6 and 22 percent and wage
increases between 15 and 28 percent.
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In terms of applicability to potential federal
changes to the corporate income tax, there are
some caveats to consider. First, all empirical
estimates are necessarily from a different time and
place, compared with when and where a new
policy will be implemented. Second, the United
States has a different baseline than other countries
that change corporate tax policy. Third, it is
unclear how other countries, U.S. state
government policy, and our own Federal Reserve
might react to federal corporate tax policy
changes. Finally, the state-level estimates we cite
are all in the context of existing federal policy, and
these differences pale in comparison with many
international business climate differences.
Although there is some uncertainty about how
well existing empirical estimates would translate
to any federal corporate income tax reduction, we
find the notion that corporate tax reform would
boost employment and wages to be a strong
result.
II. Introduction
The United States has the highest top
marginal corporate income tax rate among the
OECD members at 35 percent (38.9 percent when
1
combined with subnational taxes). The U.S.
corporate tax rate is the highest among the OECD
group and the third highest rate in the world,
surpassed only by Puerto Rico and the United
2
Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, corporate income tax
rates have been declining around the world for
the last two decades; the average corporate
income tax rate in the OECD has fallen from 30
percent in 2003 to 22.5 percent in 2016.3
Despite high corporate income tax rates, the
United States collects relatively little revenue
from the corporate income tax — slightly more
than $300 billion in 2016, which amounts to about
10 percent of all federal receipts.4 High corporate

1

income tax rates are cause for concern; high rates
deter multinationals from locating investment in
the United States and, more generally, reduce the
amount of capital formation in the country.
Lowering corporate tax rates is cited as a top
policy priority by multinational corporations over
5
changing other aspects of the tax code.
More generally, the contrast between the high
rates and low income illustrates a basic problem
with taxing corporation income: It is an incredibly
distorting tax. Companies go to great lengths to
reduce or eliminate tax liability, and despite the
best intentions of Congress or the White House, it
can be difficult or impossible — from both a
political and a practical perspective — to reduce
or eliminate such behavior.
However, the tax treatment of corporations
may also have implications that extend beyond
the boardroom to affect the U.S. labor force. There
is a growing empirical literature on the effect of
corporate income taxes on employment and
income. Empirical estimates, rather than
theoretical models that abstract from many of the
realities of the U.S. and world economy, offer the
best hope of understanding how changes to the
current federal corporation income tax may affect
workers. Empirical estimates in the existing
literature come with a unique set of challenges —
including methodological issues, data
applicability, and the geographic area analyzed —
that do not make them perfectly applicable to
recent tax reform discussions without some
caveats.
In general, empirical work with the strongest
results — that best control for other factors of
influence — estimates an elasticity of
employment regarding the corporate income tax
rate of between -0.2 and -0.4, with a wage-income
elasticity near -0.5. In terms of prediction, These
elasticities imply that a 10 percent decrease in the
corporate tax rate would lead to a 2 percent to 4
percent increase in employment and a 5 percent
gain in wages.

OECD, “Corporate and Capital Income Taxes,” at Table II.1
(2017).
2

Kyle Pomerleau and Emily Potosky, “Corporate Income Tax
Rates Around the World, 2016,” The Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact
No. 525 (2016).
3

Id.

4

Office of Management and Budget Historical Tables,
“Percentage Composition of Receipts by Source: 1934-2021,” at
Table 2.2 (corporate taxes averaged 10.1 percent of federal receipts
between 2000 and 2015).

5

Tom Neubig, “Where’s the Applause? Why Most Corporations
Prefer a Lower Rate?” Tax Notes, Apr. 24, 2006, p. 483.
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III. Conceptual Framework
The economic effects of the corporate income
tax are wide-ranging. Because the corporate
income tax is essentially a tax on profits, it affects
all decisions regarding how corporations earn a
profit. While this report considers how it affects
employment and wages, the corporate income tax
also affects where companies locate, the amount
of capital investment, where to locate that
investment, and various other decisions.
A. Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax
There is a long literature that examines the
incidence of corporate taxes, with implications for
employment (and wages). “Incidence” refers to
which entity bears the burden of the tax after
considering the cumulative effects the tax may
have on various prices and corporate behavior.
The entity that writes the check does not
necessarily pay the tax, economics has long taught
us.
For example, when corporate taxes increase,
we would say that workers effectively pay the
incremental tax if we observed that wages and
employment decline as a result. Alan J. Auerbach6
offers an extensive review of corporate tax
incidence, focusing on how theoretical models
explain the incidence of the corporate tax and how
different variations of these models can imply
something different about who ultimately pays
for the corporate tax. Auerbach points out that if a
corporate income tax causes the capital-labor ratio
to decline, it would result in falling wages and
workers bearing the burden of the tax.
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R.
Hines7 offer a lucid explanation of how corporate
income taxes may in theory adversely affect
workers in both a closed and open economy. In a
closed economy model, which probably doesn’t
represent the United States well, Desai, Foley, and
Hines point out that taxes on corporate income
raise the cost of production done by corporations.

6

Alan J. Auerbach, “Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of
What We Know,” in 20 Tax Pol’y and the Econ. (2006).

However, not all production is done through
corporations — the high corporate tax rates have
begotten a large number of partnerships, sole
proprietorships, S corporations, and other
passthrough entities — so the corporate tax may
induce production to shift to the noncorporate
sector. If the ratio of capital to labor is higher in the
noncorporate sector, resources flowing into the
noncorporate sector will raise the demand for
capital in turn, which could conceivably raise the
after-tax return on capital enough to induce
substitution away from labor and toward capital.
The result would be that workers bear the burden
of the corporate income tax.8
Desai aver that in an open economy, which
may be a better representation of the United
States, corporate taxes may be even more likely to
be paid for by workers. Their intuition is that if
capital is mobile across international borders,
then the after-tax return to capital must be the
same across the economies of the world in
equilibrium (presuming that capital flows to the
highest after-tax return destination). If this is true,
corporate income taxes discourage investment in
a country. Also, because the after-tax return to
capital must equalize across countries, inputs that
are immobile (or less mobile) will bear the burden
of the corporate income tax. Labor, or other less
mobile factors of production, would therefore pay
for the corporate income tax via lower wages.
IV. Empirical Evidence
The intuition in Desai, Foley, and Hines,
comes from a long line of theoretical work on the
corporate income tax. Economists have
traditionally used dynamic, general equilibrium,
theoretical models of the U.S. economy to study
how corporate taxes affect employment and
wages. The problem with these models is that
they may miss important aspects of the real
economy that are relevant to the relationship
between corporate taxes and outcomes for
workers. More recently, the availability of data
and advances in econometric techniques have
allowed for an empirical investigation into how

7

Desai, Foley, and Hines, “Labor and Capital Shares of the
Corporate Tax Burden: International Evidence,” unpublished
manuscript prepared for presentation at the International Tax
Policy Forum and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center conference
on Who Pays the Corporate Tax in an Open Economy? (Dec. 18,
2007).

8

Desai, Foley, and Hines note that this effect is mitigated by the
fact that labor costs are deductible under a corporate income tax, so
the initial effect of a corporate income tax would be to substitute
toward labor in the corporate sector.
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corporate taxes affect economic activity. We
examine that literature to gain an understanding
of how the corporate income tax affects labor —
not in theory, but in practice.
A. U.S. Evidence at the Federal Level
Karel Mertens and Morten O. Ravn9 provide
the only recent direct evidence on the effects of the
federal corporate income tax rate on employment.
Following Christina Romer and David Romer,10
Mertens and Ravn rely on the “narrative” method
of estimation, which attempts to sort out tax
changes that were in effect a “surprise” to the
economy. Their goal is to separate the effect of the
tax change from other factors that occur
simultaneously in the economy — most notably a
response to deficit concerns.
Mertens and Ravn rely on a sample of
quarterly data on the U.S. economy from 1950 to
2006 and directly examine corporate tax liability
rather than a policy measure like corporate tax
rates. They find that a 1 percentage point
reduction in the average corporate income tax rate
increases real GDP per capita immediately by 0.4
percent and by another 0.6 percent with a oneyear lag. They also find that cutting the average
corporate tax rate does not affect tax revenue and
does not affect employment in the aggregate.
While the Mertens and Ravn work is novel in
its approach and unique in examining U.S. federal
corporate taxes only, it has several shortcomings
that call into question their failure to discern any
employment effects of a change in the corporate
tax rate.
First, the analysis uses the average corporate
tax rate as a measure of corporate income tax
policy, calculated as tax liability divided by
corporate profits. The problem with this approach
is that anything that affects corporate profits or
general tax liability that might also affect
employment might bias the study’s results. For
example, if the economy is moving into recession,
corporate profits typically shrink. This would

9

Mertens and Ravn, “The Dynamic Effects of Personal and
Corporate Income Tax Changes in the United States,” 103 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1212 (2013).
10

Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks,” 100
Am. Econ. Rev. 763 (2010).

artificially inflate the Mertens and Ravn measure
of average corporate tax rate at a time when firms
are likely shedding employees — causing
estimates of tax policy to be biased against finding
an employment effect.
Second, it relies on a small set of corporate tax
changes — 16 in total over 56 years of data. In fact,
11
Alexander Ljungqvist and Michael Smolyansky
point out that there have been only three rate
changes to the top federal corporate tax rate since
1969 (as opposed to 271 state-level changes): a 2
percentage point decline in 1979, a 12-point
reduction in 1986, and a 1 percentage point
increase in 1993. It is not clear to us how
representative the changes identified by Mertens
and Ravn are, beyond the three explicit rate
reductions in the current economic climate.
Finally, Mertens and Ravn rely on time-series
variation and simply cannot rule out the
possibility that other factors in the economy,
changing at or around the same time as their
narrative shocks, are driving their results.
Mertens and Ravn are not able to construct a valid
counterfactual benchmark for how the U.S.
employment situation would have evolved in the
absence of corporate income tax changes.
B. Evidence From U.S. States
The promise of using state-level changes in
the corporation tax rate is that it provides a much
larger and stronger data set that makes
controlling for economic fluctuations and similar
exogenous forces easier to accomplish.
12
J. William Harden and William H. Hoyt
provide an important review of the older economic
literature that generally examines how state taxes
(including business incentives and the corporate
tax) affect employment as well as an analysis of
how corporate taxes affect employment. Using
annual U.S. state-level data between 1977 and 1994,
Harden and Hoyt control for fixed state and year
differences in the data and by doing so identify the
effect of corporate taxes on employment using

11

Ljungqvist and Smolyansky, “To Cut or Not to Cut? On the
Impact of Corporate Taxes on Employment and Income,” Finance
and Economics Discussion Series Federal Reserve Board of
Governors Working Paper (2016).
12

Harden and Hoyt, “Do States Choose Their Mix of Taxes to
Minimize Employment Losses?” 56 Nat’l Tax J. 7 (2003).
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state-level corporate tax changes. Harden and Hoyt
take an all-encompassing view of the corporate tax,
measuring the size of the corporate tax burden as
corporate tax revenue divided by personal income
in a state. Importantly, because corporations may
take time in adjusting to corporate tax policy,
Harden and Hoyt examine the effects on
employment through a lagged relationship.
Harden and Hoyt find a negative and
statistically significant relationship between the
corporate tax burden in a state and employment
growth. Holding total revenue constant, Harden
and Hoyt estimate that shifting 10 percent of the
tax burden in a state from the corporate tax to
another revenue source would increase the
employment growth rate by 2.83 percent.
Notably, the gains Harden and Hoyt report are for
individual income taxes replacing corporate
taxes; employment gains would likely be larger if
revenue were replaced with a more efficient tax,
such as a VAT, a carbon tax, or some other tax on
consumption.
13
Alison R. Felix extends the previous
literature by examining the effect of U.S. state
corporate taxes on worker wages using a more
recent data set spanning the period between 1977
and 2005. Felix estimates the relationship between
corporate taxes and wages using a simple
regression framework. She controls for the many
other factors besides taxes that might affect
worker wages, including individual factors (such
as age, education, and occupation) as well as
other, state-level factors (including income taxes,
sales taxes, and government services). She uses
the top marginal corporate tax rate in a state to
measure the corporate tax burden and estimate
the relationship between corporate taxes and
wages.
The Felix model indicates a negative and
statistically significant relationship between the
top marginal corporate tax rate and worker
wages, with a magnitude that suggests that a 1
percentage point increase in the top corporate tax
rate will reduce employment by between 0.14 and
0.36 percent. A 15 percent corporate rate
reduction, then, translates to employment gains

of between 2 percent and 5 percent — the
equivalent of 2.8 million to 7 million new workers.
Felix also shows that while the effect of the top
marginal corporate tax rate is negative
throughout the sample period, the relationship
between the corporate tax rate and employment is
stronger in the later part of the sample rather than
in the earlier part. In fact, between 1997 and 2001,
a 1 percentage point increase in the top corporate
tax rate reduces employment by nearly 0.7
percent, which is more than double the effect in
the earlier years of the sample. The changing
relationship between the corporate tax and wages
could result from increased competition among
U.S. states or by foreign nations for mobile capital,
she hypothesizes.
14
Xiaobing Shuai and Christine Chmura
further extend previous analyses of U.S. state
corporate tax policy by using updated data on job
creation and state corporate tax policy changes
between 1990 and 2012. During the sample period
used by Shuai and Chmura, 30 states made
corporate tax rate changes, which offers a
“laboratory” to discover how differences in the
corporate tax rate affect job creation.
The Shuai and Chmura model controls for
general time effects using a fixed-effects
estimation strategy, which offers control over
many other factors that could bias their study, but
their preferred model does not incorporate statelevel fixed effects. The Shuai and Chmura
estimates indicate that state corporate tax rates are
negatively and statistically significantly related to
employment growth. They estimate that
employment will grow 0.03 to 0.05 percentage
points faster in a state with a 1 percentage point
lower corporate tax rate, or that the elasticity of
employment regarding the corporate tax rate is
-0.2. That translates to employment growth of 0.6
percent to 1 percent faster per year for a reduction
in the corporate tax rate to 15 percent, as proposed
by the Trump administration.
15
Xavier Giroud and Joshua Rauh also exploit
state corporate tax policy differences as they
14

Shuai and Chmura, “The Effect of State Corporate Income Tax
Rate Cuts on Job Creation,” 48 Bus. Econ. 183 (2013).
15

13

Felix, “Do State Corporate Income Taxes Reduce Wages?” 94
Econ. Rev. – Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City 77 (2009).

Giroud and Rauh, “State Taxation and the Reallocation of
Business Activity: Evidence From Establishment-Level Data,”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21534
(2015).
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relate to employment and business establishment
location. They constructed a sample of all U.S.
business establishments with at least 100
employees that were active in multiple states
between 1977 and 2011. Their model controls for
constant differences among states, time-varying
characteristics that are common to all states, and
many other economic factors that differ across
both states and time.
They find that a 1 percentage point increase in
a state corporate tax rate leads to the closing of
0.03 business establishments and that about half
of the effect occurs because companies can shift
locations to competing states. On the employment
side, Giroud and Rauh find that a 10 percent
increase in the corporate tax rate corresponds to a
4 percent decline in employment at corporations
that are subject to the tax increase. As a check for
spurious correlation, Giroud and Rauh find no
correlation between employment at corporations
and changes in the personal income tax rate,
lending credibility to their estimates.
Finally, Ljungqvist and Smolyansky estimate
the effect of U.S. state corporate tax changes using
the experience of counties located on the border of
states with differing tax policies. Their data span
1970-2010, and they examine 140 separate tax
increases in 45 states (and the District of Columbia)
and 131 tax cuts in 35 states for their analysis. The
employment data they analyze are taken from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic
Accounts, which documents annual employment
and income at the county level. Their analysis relies
heavily on the natural experiment approach to state
corporate tax changes but also controls for timevarying factors such as demographic characteristics
of residents.
They find that increasing the corporate tax
rate leads to significant reductions in employment
(and income) for residents. They estimate that a 1
percentage point increase in the top marginal
corporate income tax rate reduces employment by
0.3 percent to 0.5 percent, but they also find that
cutting corporate taxes does not have a
corresponding positive effect unless the
government implements the reductions during a
recession.
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky also find a large
effect on incomes, with a 1 percentage point
increase in the top marginal corporate income tax

rate corresponding to an income loss of between
0.3 percent and 0.6 percent. Cutting corporate
taxes does not have a corresponding positive
effect on income unless (again) the cuts are made
during a recession.
Importantly, Ljungqvist and Smolyansky use
a measure of employment and income based on
the residence of individuals and not the location of
businesses. This likely means they underestimate
the effect of corporate taxes on the outcomes of
interest because workers themselves are mobile
and may look for work in neighboring counties
when corporate tax changes affect their wages.
As a partial solution to this problem, Shawn
Rohlin, Stuart Rosenthal, and Amanda Ross16 use
data that is based on business location and apply
a similar border method to state-level corporate
tax changes. They examine the effects of tax
changes on the propensity for businesses to open
in the face of corporate income tax changes and
find extremely large and negative effects — a
higher corporate tax substantially reduces the
probability that a new business starts operation in
an area, which necessarily reduces employment.
The primary sample used by Rohlin, Rosenthal,
and Ross examines border states with a reciprocal
tax agreement so that labor mobility across
borders is not an issue in their estimates.
The data show that a 1 percentage point
increase in the top marginal corporate tax rate
reduces the likelihood of a corporate business
opening in the county by a whopping 34 percent.
This effect is larger for manufacturing and
service-based businesses and slightly smaller for
retail-based businesses.
In short, the data from state-based research
consistently reveals that higher corporate taxes
reduce employment and compensation.
C. International Evidence
The U.S state corporate tax literature may
offer the most potential for understanding the
effects of changing federal corporate tax policy
because all states operate within the laws and
business climate of the United States. However,
state corporate tax policy may be dwarfed by

16

Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross, “Tax Avoidance and Business
Location in a State Border Model,” 83 J. of Urban Econ. 34 (2014).
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federal policy, so using state data to infer the effect
of changes at the federal level may very well cause
economists to underestimate the size of expected
federal changes.
Examining corporate tax policy from an
international perspective is advantageous
because it can give a clearer picture of the
potential effects of corporate tax policy changes
on a national basis. However, the apparent gain in
estimating size effects comes at the cost of
examining corporate taxes in what is often a
completely different legal and business
environment than that of the United States.
What’s more, most other OECD countries —
they’re typically the comparisons used, by dint of
the availability of data as well as the fact that they
comprise the universe of developed countries —
are much more closely integrated with their
immediate neighbors and trading partners than is
the United States, making such comparisons
complicated.
A few international studies are similar to
analyses made across U.S. states, examining
corporate tax policy across areas within a country
where policy differs. We analyze a few such
studies, all of which have been published
relatively recently.
For instance, Lars Feld and Gebhard
17
Kirchgässner examine the effect of corporate
taxes on resident employment across Swiss
cantons (a canton is a division of the country
similar to states in the United States). They show
that corporate income taxes deter companies from
operating and reduce employment for residents
after controlling for factors like wages, education,
and demographic differences. Their data
encompass the years 1985 to 1997, in a context of
low federal corporate income taxes, and reveal a
relatively small magnitude of response from
employment — a 10 percent increase in corporate
tax leads to an employment loss of about 1
percent.
18
Simeon Djankov and his coauthors study the
effect of corporate taxes using a cross section of 85

countries in the year 2004, focusing on how one
country’s policy would affect a standardized
company. This approach is interesting because it
examines corporate tax policy in many countries,
but the use of only a cross section, as opposed to a
panel of data, means that other differences across
countries might influence the results. Djankov et
al. do not examine employment directly but
instead examine entrepreneurship, finding that
corporate taxes have a large negative effect on
entrepreneurial activity (as well as a large
negative effect on foreign direct investment,
which is directly relevant to job creation and
wages). They estimate that a 10 percentage point
increase in the corporate tax rate (applying to
first-year businesses) reduces the number of
companies by 1.9 per 100 people, or by 38 percent.
They also find that a 10 percentage point increase
in the average corporate tax rate reduces the rate
of businesses entering a country by 1.4 percentage
points, or 17.5 percent at the mean.
Using a smaller sample of countries over a 25year panel, Kevin Hassett and Aparna Mathur19
are able to account for country-specific fixed
effects, or anything else about a country that
differs, besides the corporate tax, and is constant
across time. The Hassett and Mathur model also
controls for time-period effects and other factors
that change across both time and countries
besides corporate taxes. They find that corporate
taxes (measured as either effective or marginal
rates) have a substantial negative effect on worker
wages — a 1 percent increase in the corporate tax
rate leads to a 0.5 percent decline in wages.
Wiji Arulampalam, Michael Devereux, and
20
Giorgia Maffini also use a panel of data,
examining 55,000 individual companies operating
in nine European countries (Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) to examine the
effect of corporate taxes on employee wages over
the years 1996-2003. Using microdata on
individual companies, the study controls for
many factors that may not be accounted for in

17

Feld and Kirchgässner, “The Impact of Corporate and
Personal Income Taxes on the Location of Firms and on
Employment: Some Panel Evidence for the Swiss Cantons,” 87 J. of
Pub. Econ. 129 (2002).
18

Djankov et al., “The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment
and Entrepreneurship,” 2 Am. Econ. J.: Macroeconomics 31 (2010).

19

Hassett and Mathur, “A Spatial Model of Corporate Tax
Incidence,” 47 Applied Econ. 1350 (2015).
20

Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini, “The Direct Incidence
of Corporate Income Tax on Wages,” 56 European Econ. Rev. 1038
(2012).
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previous studies. Arulampalam, Devereux, and
Maffini are also able to examine the effect of tax
changes at the individual company level, which is
advantageous because it accurately depicts
exactly the amount of tax being paid, although it
is harder to interpret from a policy perspective.
Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini find that a
one-dollar increase in taxes results in companies’
total wage bill falling by 49 cents. This effect could
come via reduced wages, lower employment, or
some combination of the two.
Besides the previously mentioned theoretical
explanation in Desai, Foley, and Hines, their work
offers an empirical investigation into the
incidence of the corporate tax using data from
American multinational companies operating
between 1989 and 2004. They estimate that a large
portion of corporate taxes are borne by workers.
While their estimates depend on the period and
empirical specification, they show that ultimately
workers pay between 45 percent and 75 percent of
the corporate tax burden, which suggests that
wages and employment necessarily fall when
corporate tax rates rise and vice versa.
Marco Da Rin, Marina Di Giacomo, and
21
Alessandro Sembenelli show that corporate tax
policy may interact with other aspects of a
country’s economy and find that countries with
better “institutional infrastructure” — that is, a
respect for the rule of law, predictable changes in
policy, and strong property rights protected by
courts with deep knowledge of such issues —
experience more benefits from lowering their
corporate taxes. This has implications for U.S.
corporate tax policy because U.S. institutional
infrastructure outside the tax code is typically
regarded favorably in the world economy.
Another important response to the corporate
tax that has implications for employment and
wages is how multinational companies choose
22
where to locate their operations. Johannes Voget
examines the location decisions of multinational
companies from 1997 to 2007 to determine how
important corporate taxes are to cross-border

relocation. Voget finds that companies are quite
responsive to the burden of home-country
taxation when considering international
relocation, and Voget estimates that for an
increase in repatriation taxes of 10 percentage
points in the home country, the share of
multinational companies relocating abroad
increases by 2.2 percentage points. Put another
way, this change would increase the number of
relocations by a third.
23
James R. Hines Jr. examines the sensitivity of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. states to
corporate tax policy. Although this is not a direct
measurement of an employment effect, the
International Trade Administration attributes 12
million U.S. jobs to FDI,24 so the link between FDI
and jobs is important. Hines shows that a state
corporate tax rate difference of just 1 percent is
associated with a difference of between 9 and 11
percent in the share of manufacturing capital
owned by differently taxed investors.
V. Conclusion and Lessons for Reform
Although the context and technique of the
studies examining the effects of the corporate
income tax we cite in this report are different —
sometimes markedly so — the balance of the
literature shows a substantial negative effect of
corporate taxes on labor, through employment,
wages, and the business location. Studies with the
stronger results that control for factors of
influence outside corporate income taxes
generally have an elasticity of employment
regarding the corporate income tax rate of
between -0.2 and -0.4, with a wage-income
elasticity near -0.5. That is, for a 10 percent
decrease in the corporate tax rate, the existing
empirical literature shows an increase in
employment of between 2 and 4 percent, along
with a 5 percent gain in wages.
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This estimate includes direct employment at foreign-owned
companies, indirect and induced employment from foreign-owned
companies, and indirect and induced employment from
productivity spillovers resulting from foreign-owned companies.
The figure comes from the International Trade Administration
publication: Julian Richards and Elizabeth Schaefer, “Jobs
Attributable to Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,”
Industry and Analysis Economics Brief, International Trade
Administration (2016).
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In terms of applicability to potential federal
changes to the corporate income tax, there are
some caveats to consider.
First, all empirical estimates are necessarily
derived from a different time and place than
when and where a new policy will be
implemented. This calls into question how similar
the current economic climate today is to the
climate (place, time, existing policies, and
industrial mix) when the studies we cite were
completed. In terms of studies that examine
corporate taxes internationally over time, this
validity problem may be especially severe — the
United States has a particular set of laws,
regulations, and workforce characteristics that are
very different from other countries, all of which
might make the effect of corporate income taxes
on employment and wages more or less severe
here than elsewhere.
Second, the United States has a different
baseline than other countries that change their
corporate tax policy — having the highest top
statutory corporate tax rate among developed
nations and being the largest economy in the
world may make the effects of corporate income
taxes different here.
Third, it is unclear how other countries, U.S.
state governments, and our own Federal Reserve

may react to federal corporate tax policy changes;
any policy changes they enact in response may
serve to mute or exacerbate expected effects.
Finally, the state-level estimates we cite are all
in the context of existing federal policy, and while
there are considerable differences in state
business climates, these differences pale in
comparison with many international business
climate differences. It is likely that the corporate
income tax interacts with the general business
climate, which might mean that changing the
federal corporate income tax would do more to
attract new companies from outside the United
States (or slow the flow of corporate inversions)
than any state change could, resulting in a larger
effect on employment than state-level estimates
suggest.
Although there is some uncertainty about
how well existing empirical estimates would
translate to any reduction in federal corporate
income tax, nearly all empirical studies suggest
there would be some gains for labor from the
change. This is highlighted by estimates of
corporate tax incidence that suggest it is labor that
pays for most of the corporate income tax. 
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